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CHAPTER 9A
The EU Common Market
Armin Cuyvers
9.1 Introduction
The internal market is both an end in itself and a means to a higher end.1 
Article 2 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome already declared that the (then) European 
Economic Community (EEC) aimed to establish a Common Market between 
the Member States.2 The EEC, therefore, already had a clear economic objec-
tive of increasing economic integration and the living conditions in a Europe 
impoverished after two world wars.3 At the same time, the market was also a 
means to an end. It was thought that by integrating markets and economies, 
peace and stability would follow. Not only would Member States become 
accustomed to cooperation and dialogue, economic integration would also 
lead to a de facto solidarity and would make waging war economically impossi-
ble. The economic costs of conflict would simply become too high, preventing 
conflicts as long as some form of rational decision making would be in place. 
It was this dual purpose of the internal market that formed part of the genius 
of European integration.
This chapter will briefly introduce some of the main features of the EU inter-
nal market, focusing on the early stages of integration the combined use of 
negative and positive integration and the increasing convergence between the 
freedoms. Subsequently, EU chapters 10 to 13 will separately discuss the four 
individual freedoms underlying the internal market, being the free movement 
1   For a more detailed analyses of the internal market and its development see inter alia N.N. 
Shuibne, The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law. Constitutional Responsibility and the Court 
of Justice (OUP, 2013), S.C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU. The Four Freedoms (4th edn, 
OUP 2015), or P.J.G. Kapteyn, A.M. McDonnell, K.J.M. Mortelmans, and C.W.A. Timmermans 
(eds), The Law of the European Union and the European Communities (4th revised edition, 
Kluwer Law International 2008).
2   The objective can currently be found in Article 3(3) TEU. Note that in the early days of 
European integration the term Common Market was used, as currently in the EAC, before the 
terminology of an internal market was adopted to stress the complete removal of barriers.
3   See for some economic analysis of the internal market inter alia W. Molle, The Economics of 
European Integration (Aldershot, 2006) or J. Pelkmans, European Integration: Methods and 
Economic Analysis (Longman, 1997).
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of goods, services and establishment, persons, and capital. We begin, however, 
with the concept of an internal market as such.
9.2 The Concept of an Internal Market
Article 26 TFEU defines the internal market as ‘an area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital 
is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty’. This very broad 
concept was further developed, albeit still in a very general manner, by the 
CJEU in its Schul judgement:
The concept of a common market as defined by the court in a consis-
tent line of decisions involves the elimination of all obstacles to intra- 
community trade in order to merge the national markets into a single 
market bringing about conditions as close as possible to those of a genu-
ine internal market.4
The essential aim of an internal market, therefore, is to make trade between 
Member States as easy as trade within a single state. Geographic realities such 
as distance and mountains aside, a Danish company should be able to sell its 
goods or services just as easily in Italy as in Denmark itself. The main idea is 
that such an internal market allows all the factors of production, labour, capi-
tal and enterprise, to move freely, generating maximum allocative efficiency 
and hence increasing overall wealth.
An internal market, therefore, is a far reaching form of economic integra-
tion. It goes beyond a free trade area and a customs union, as it aims to remove 
all obstacles to free movement and create a market that functions as if all 
Member States are one country. The ambitious nature of this aim comes into 
focus when one realizes that almost any national rule may be able to affect free 
movement, as we shall see in more detail in the coming chapters on the spe-
cific free movement rights. Creating an internal market, therefore, is not just 
an economic but also a major political project. An internal market, however, 
is not yet the most intense form of economic integration beyond statehood. 
For in the final step, a full economic union, an internal market is combined 
with the complete integration of monetary and fiscal policy as well. The EU 
has moved a long way towards economic union as well, as will be discussed in 
4   Case 15/81, Schul, [1982] ECR 1982, 1409.
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more detail in EU chapter 13, even though that process has run into significant 
challenges, which other regional systems should try to avoid.5
9.3 The Time Line of the EU Internal Market
Something as complex as an internal market cannot be established overnight, 
already because Member State economies and legal systems need time to 
adjust. Establishing an internal market, therefore, requires several phases and 
transition periods. The first step in the development of the EU internal market 
was the creation of a customs union, on which the internal market, according 
to Article 28 TFEU, remains based:
The Union shall comprise a customs union which shall cover all trade in 
goods and which shall involve the prohibition between Member States of 
customs duties on imports and exports and of all charges having equiva-
lent effect, and the adoption of a common customs tariff in their rela-
tions with third countries.6
The crux of a customs union, which forms one step up from a free trade area, 
is that not only the tariffs and quotas internally, so between members, are 
removed, but that the members also agree to apply a common tariff externally, 
so on goods entering the union from outside. Once goods have entered this 
customs union, they can be moved around freely in the entire union, inter alia 
removing the need for burdensome rules of origin.7 The uniformity of the cus-
toms regulation then becomes vital, as the conditions for access to the terri-
tory of the customs union must be the same in all Member States, which also 
explains why the customs union is an exclusive competence of the EU.8
The customs union was established in phases, allowing Member States to 
gradually reduce tariffs and adjust, whilst prohibiting new tariffs. The cus-
toms union was completed on 1 July 1968, when all ‘internal’ tariffs between 
5   In addition, as also pointed out in Chapter 10, para. 2, these distinctions and steps are 
theoretical constructs, and ‘In practice, regional cooperation does not fit exactly into 
these theoretical pigeon holes’. In practice integration can blend certain steps or only com-
plete certain steps incompletely.
6   Compare also the former Article 23 EC, holding that ‘The Community shall be based upon a 
customs union (. . .).’
7   See on the EAC challenges on this point also Chapter 10.3.4.
8   Article 3(a) TFEU.
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the (then six) Member States had been removed, and common customs tariff 
for the entire Community had been established. At this date, however, a real 
internal market, originally planned to be in place by 1 January 1970, was, still 
a long way off. In fact, European integration was facing several political crises, 
and political faith in the entire project had been reduced significantly.9 During 
the political stagnation, however, it was the CJEU that picked up the integra-
tion gauntlet, as will be discussed in more detail below and the next chapters. 
It really was the CJEU’s case law on free movement that provided the most 
important contribution to the development of the internal market in the 1960’s 
and 70’s. This case law probably saved the project from a complete demise, and 
progressively turned the internal market into a legal reality.
In the eighties, different political elites in Europe got their second European 
wind, as economic growth increased and political support for the internal 
market project picked up. The re-launch of the European internal market 
that followed is usually linked to an important White Paper on ‘Completing 
the Internal Market’ by the Commission that appeared on 14 June 1985.10 
The White Paper laid out an ambitious agenda to create a truly internal mar-
ket. It included a list of 279 legislative measures that should all be in place by 
31 December 1992, the date on which the market should be ‘complete’.11
Partially based on the economic benefits that such integration would 
bring,12 the White Paper was followed by decisive political action in the form 
of the Single European Union Act (SEA) 1986.13 Crucially, the SEA both for-
mulated the Treaty objective to create an internal market as now formulated 
in Article 26 TEU, and provided the political mechanisms to actually create 
it. One of the most important changes was the introduction of the current 
Article 114 TFEU, which allowed internal market legislation to be adopted by 
9    See also EU chapter 1 for a further description of some of these crises in European integra-
tion, which show that the EU has often developed in a pattern of crisis followed by deeper 
integration.
10   Commission White Paper ‘Completing the Internal Market’ COM(85)310.
11   This White Paper, therefore, creates an interesting blue print for comparison, for example 
with the East African Community Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers Act 2015.
12   See for contemporary analyses for example M. Emerson, M. Aujean, M. Catinat, P. Goybet, 
and A. Jacquemin, The Economics of 1992: The EC Commission’s Assessment of the Economic 
Effects of Completing the Internal Market (OUP, 1988), or P. Cecchini, The European 
Challenge 1992: The Benefits of a Single Market (Gower, 1988). For later analysis see inter 
alia W. Molle, The Economics of European Integration (Aldershot, 2006).
13   For further analysis on why the SEA could be adopted politically, aside from economic 
benefits, see for example P. Craig, ‘Integration, Democracy and Legitimacy’ in P. Craig and 
G. de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2010), ch. 1.
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qualified majority. This removed the veto-power of each individual Member 
State, which had often blocked political decision making before.
With new political vigour and qualified majority voting, the internal mar-
ket project took off, and was for the major part ‘finished’ in 1992.14 Work was 
then started on economic integration with the Maastricht commitment to 
introduce a single European currency.15 In addition, work continued to fur-
ther develop the internal market, which was of course not yet fully finished 
even though the main aims of the 1992 project had been achieved. Currently, 
the main areas where the EU internal market needs to be improved concern 
services and the digital market.16 After all, the EU internal market was largely 
developed in a time where the trade in goods made up over 70% of the econ-
omy and the internet did not yet exist. In our current digital age and services-
driven economic reality, however, some adjustment may be in order. The need 
for adjustment and modernisation also creates opportunities for more recent 
forms of regional integration. They can leap-frog ahead and develop their 
internal market law with these new challenges and opportunities in mind. In 
addition, newly formed internal markets may also learn from the EU struggles 
to include a social dimension in the internal market, as a failure to do so may 
undermine the legitimacy of the market in the longer run.17
9.4 Combining Negative and Positive Integration
The EU internal market depends on a combination of negative and positive 
integration. A full understanding of the internal market therefore requires a 
proper understanding of both mechanisms, as well as their interaction.
The term negative integration denotes the use of legally enforceable pro-
hibitions that forbid Member States to restrict free movement. For example, 
Article 34 TFEU prohibits any Member State rule that restricts the free 
14   See the Commission Recommendation of 12 July 2004 on the transposition into national 
law of directives affecting the internal market, O.J. [2005], L 98/47.
15   See further EU chapters 1 and 13 on this process.
16   See for more discussion EU chapter 12, as well as the newly launched Commission ini-
tiative on the Digital Internal Market, available via <https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/
digital-single-market_en>.
17   See on this increasingly problematic issue B, de Witte, ‘Non-Market Values in Internal 
Market Legislation’, in N. Nic Shuibhne (ed), Regulating the Internal Market (Edward Elgar, 
2006), 75 or the 210 Monti report ‘A New Strategy for the Single Market, At the Service of 
Europe’s Economy and Society’.
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movement of goods unless it can be justified.18 As this prohibition is directly 
applicable and supreme, it allows individuals and companies to challenge any 
national rules that limit their free movement before a national court.19 Aided 
by the CJEU and national courts, negative integration therefore allows individ-
uals and companies to act as a kind of legal bulldozers that remove all obsta-
cles to free movement.20 The functioning of negative integration, moreover, 
depends on courts and individuals, not on political action. It can therefore sur-
vive, or even thrive, in periods of political stagnation.
Negative integration in the EU is based on a collection of Treaty provisions 
that prohibit restrictions on all four freedoms and provide some exceptions 
for rules that serve public interests.21 The structure of the Treaty provisions 
concerning the different freedoms is very similar. First, the Treaty contains 
a general prohibition on any obstacles to the specific freedom, then it pro-
vides for a limited set of exceptions to the prohibition, based on such issues 
as public health and national security.22 As indicated above, the Court of 
Justice has played a key role in making negative integration effective in the 
EU. For example, it was the CJEU that found all these prohibitions had direct 
effect, allowing them to be effectively enforced. In addition, the CJEU devel-
oped a very wide definition of restriction, meaning that the free movement 
clauses could be used to challenge an extremely broad array of national rules 
that de facto limited free movement, even if they were not even indirectly 
discriminatory.23 Exceptions, on the other hand, were interpreted narrowly, 
meaning that it becomes harder for Member State to justify restrictions on 
public interest grounds.
Negative integration, however, has its limits. To begin with, it can only 
remove national obstacles, it cannot create new, better laws to replace the 
ones that have been disapplied. Negative integration also depends on indi-
vidual actors, which may lead to incoherence as some restrictions are chal-
lenged and others are not. In addition, negative integration cannot harmonize 
18   See for a further discussion of this prohibition EU chapter 10.
19   See EU chapter 4 on the concept of direct effect and its pivotal importance for EU law.
20   On the importance of national courts in this process also see K. Lenaerts, ‘The Court’s 
Outer and Inner Selves: Exploring the External and Internal Legitimacy of the European 
Court of Justice’, in M. Adams, H. De Waele, J. Meeusen and G. Straetmans (eds), Judging 
Europe’s Judges, The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice (Hart, 
2013), 40, as well as EU chapter 9.
21   Articles 30, 34, 35, 45, 49, 56, 63 and 110 TFEU.
22   See generally C. Barnard, ‘Derogations, justifications and the Four Freedoms’, in 
C. Barnard and O. Odudu (eds.) The Outer Limits of European Union Law, (OUP, 2009).
23   See for example Case 8/74, Dassonville, [1974], ECR 837, and EU chapters 10–13.
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the restrictive laws that are justified and remain in place. After all, many rules 
that restrict free movement, such as consumer protection or food safety rules, 
are highly desirable, and can also be justified under EU law. Free movement 
is not the same as total deregulation. Where all Member States adopt differ-
ent but justifiable laws on, for example, food safety, however, free movement 
of food stuffs would still be seriously undermined. A Dutch dairy producer, 
for instance, would still have to deal with different food laws in each Member 
State, which de facto undermines the free movement of his product.
For all these reasons, negative integration needs to be complemented by 
so-called positive integration.24 The concept of positive integration essen-
tially denotes the use of EU legislation to harmonize or replace national laws.25 
Such EU rules can then serve the required public interests, such as food safety, 
without creating unnecessary obstacles to free movement. For example, the 
EU could adopt a directive on the minimum standards for dairy products. This 
directive could provide effective and uniform protection to all consumers in 
the EU, but would also allow producers that meet these minimum standards to 
sell their product throughout the entire EU. By harmonizing the level of pro-
tection at the EU level, therefore, legislation that protects public interests does 
not have to create differences between national laws that hinder free move-
ment. Under the Tedeschi principle, moreover, free movement prohibitions 
no longer apply once secondary EU legislation is in place. The free movement 
clauses cannot be used, therefore, to challenge national restrictions to free 
movement that are based on EU legislation.26
The introduction of harmonization by qualified majority voting under 
the Single European Act, therefore, was so important because it enabled the 
24   Negative integration also creates its own push towards positive integration, for as 
national rules are set aside, the need arises for EU law to replace them. The East African 
Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing Protocol and the 
2006 East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing 
Act can also be seen as an example, or at least anticipation, of this process.
25   This is often done via directives, usually under Article 114 TFEU, which require all 
Member States to adopt certain national laws. As a result, all national laws adopt simi-
lar provisions, and hence are ‘harmonized’. See for the instrument of a directive EU 
chapter 3.
26   See Case C-5/77 Tedeschi ECLI:EU:C:1977:144 and Case C-573/12, Alands ECLI:EU:C: 
2014:2037. Naturally the validity of the EU legislation itself can be challenged, for instance 
for a violation of free movement principles, under Article 263 TFEU. See EU chapter 7 
and K.J.M. Mortelmans, ‘The Relationship between the Treaty Rules and Community 
Measures for the Establishment and Functioning of the Internal Market: Towards a 
Concordance Rule’ (2002), CMLRev, 1303.
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necessary positive integration to complement the negative integration already 
spearheaded by the CJEU. In addition to qualified majority voting, how-
ever, successful future positive integration also depended on more effective 
methods of harmonization. Initially, the main method used was that of total 
harmonization. Member States would for instance try to exhaustively regulate 
all product requirements for a certain product. Such total harmonisation, how-
ever, could take a very long time to reach agreement, as all details needed to 
be agreed upon.27 After the SEA, therefore, the EU also moved towards a new 
approach towards harmonization that depended more on the setting of mini-
mum standards and mutual recognition.28 This new approach significantly 
sped up harmonization and improved the quality and effectiveness of the leg-
islation adopted.
In line with the interaction between negative and positive interaction 
described above, each of the different freedoms discussed in the next chapters 
will show a similar pattern. First, negative integration is used, with the sup-
port of the CJEU, to challenge a host of national regulations. Subsequently, EU 
legislation is gradually developed to harmonize or replace national legislation, 
whereby increasingly more modern forms of harmonization are employed. 
Again, more recent forms of economic integration may learn from some of the 
detours and dead ends in this process of European integration, as they may 
try to jump directly towards more effective forms of negative and positive 
integration.
9.5 Convergence in Negative Integration
Before the next chapters discuss each individual freedom separately, how-
ever, it is useful to highlight one further overarching development in internal 
market law, being the gradual convergence of the different freedoms.29
27   See already J. Pelkmans, ‘The New Approach to Technical Harmonization and 
Standardization’ (1987) 25 CCMS, 249 as well as the White Paper of the Commission on 
this point COM(85)310.
28   See <www.newapproach.org>. See also more generally C. Janssens, The Principle of 
Mutual Recognition in EU Law (OUP, 2013), F. Kostoris Padoa Schioppa (ed), The Principle 
of Mutual Recognition in the European Integration Process (Palgrave MacMillan, 2005) 
or (on the difficulties of this approach) J. Pelkmans, ‘Mutual Recognition in Goods: 
On Promises and Disillusions’ (2007) 14 JEPP, 699, and M. Dougan, ‘Minimum 
Harmonization and the Internal Market’ (2000) 37 CMLRev, 853.
29   See also Niamh Nic Shuibne, The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law. Constitutional 
Responsibility and the Court of Justice (OUP, 2013).
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Each freedom depends on different Treaty prohibitions and exceptions. In 
addition, there are obvious differences between the different freedoms, since 
goods, services, capital and especially people have some rather significant dif-
ferences. Nevertheless, the different freedoms also have a lot in common, and 
share the purpose of creating an internal market. In line with these commonal-
ities, the case law of the CJEU is showing an increasing convergence and unity 
in the application of free movement prohibitions and exceptions.30
This convergence can first of all be seen at the general level. In all freedoms, 
for example, the CJEU has interpreted the prohibitions very broadly, whereas 
the exceptions that can justify restrictions are interpreted very narrowly. 
Equally, for all freedoms the CJEU has accepted a category of non-Treaty based 
exceptions, the so called Rule of Reason exceptions. The CJEU also applies the 
principle of mutual recognition to all freedoms, even though it was established 
in the context of the free movement of goods.31 Lastly, in most free movement 
cases, the actual assessment eventually comes down to the proportionality 
test, which is normally very similar in all freedoms.32
By now, however, the convergence extends even further than just the gen-
eral structure of free movement provisions. Case law from different freedoms 
is now often used interchangeably. Futura, for example, concerned the free-
dom to provide services, yet the CJEU also refers to case law on establishment, 
workers, and goods, which apparently are also relevant for services.33 Such 
convergence can help to increase legal certainty and promote the unity of 
internal market law. In light of the differences between the freedoms already 
referred to above, convergence can of course not be total, and differences do 
and will probably remain. These for example concern direct horizontal effect, 
the extra-territorial scope of the freedoms or the detailed legislation regulat-
ing free movement of persons. Equally, the Keck-exception has so far not been 
30   See inter alia S.C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU. The Four Freedoms (4th edn, 
OUP 2015), 24, or already J. Snell, Goods and Services in EU Law. A Study of the Relationship 
between the Freedoms (OUP, 2002) and H.D. Jarass, ‘A Unified Approach to the Fundamental 
Freedoms’, in M. Andenas and W.-H. Roth (eds), Services and Free Movement in EU Law 
(OUP, 2002).
31   Case C-120/78, Cassis de Dijon ECLI:EU:C:1979:42.
32   For an overview of this ordinary structure as well as an example of a deviatoin in the con-
text of games of chance see S.C.G. Van den Bogaert and A. Cuyvers: ‘Money For Nothing: 
The Case Law of the EU Court of Justice on the Regulation of Gambling’ Common Market 
Law Review 48 (4), 1175.
33   Case C-250/95 Futura ECLI:EU:C:1997:239. For further examples of convergence also 
see Case C-379/87, Groener ECLI:EU:C:1989:599, Case C-340/89, Vlassopoulou ECLI:EU: 
C:1991:193, or Case C-19/92, Dieter Kraus ECLI:EU:C:1993:125.
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applied outside the freedom of goods, and in certain areas the CJEU seems less 
and less committed to its position that Rule of Reason exceptions can only 
justify non-discriminatory restrictions.34
The following chapters will further explore these similarities and differ-
ences, as they systematically discuss the four different freedoms and their 
development over time. Considering the comparative objective of this book, 
moreover, these chapters will focus on the initial and foundational case law in 
the earlier stages of European integration and the basic structure this case law 
provided to get the European internal market going.
34   Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91, Keck and Mithouard ECLI:EU:C:1993:905, Case C-2/90, 
Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium ECLI:EU:C:1992:310, and Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:160.
